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I. INTRODUCTION
Normally, the market fo r property casebooks operates a t near-
perfect competition. A l l  the books cover familiar topics—acquisition,
estates, landlord-tenant, and land use. Casebooks differentiate by length,
by choosing to stress practice o r theory, o r by illustrating property's
unifying themes around land or other specialized fields of property law.
Occasionally, however, the market fo r a casebook gets h it by a
gale o f  creative destmction.
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property law, thanks to Property: Principles and Policies, by Thomas
Merrill and Henry Smith, both of Yale Law School.
Merrill and Smith  organize Property: Principles a n d  Policies
around two important themes. The  casebook integrates economic analy-
sis into legal presentation more than any other casebook on the market.
Merrill and Smith also organize their presentation around a conception of
property grounded in  exclusion. " [T]h e  right to exclude others," they
claim, explains the core o f  property better than an "ad hoc 'bundle o f
rights' without any distinguishing features." (P. v.)
t Associate Professor of Law, George Mason University. I  thank the George Mason University
School of  Law for  a research grant making this Essay possible. I  thank Bob Ellickson, Richard
Epstein, Nicole Garnett, Larissa Katz, Mark McKenna, Adam Mossoff, Steve Munzer, Chris New-
man, Carol Rose, Henry Smith, Julian Velasco, and Todd Zywicki for their comments.
1. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (George Allen
& Unwin 1976) (1942).
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This Review Essay has two aims. M y  more immediate aim is to
assess where Merrill and Smith's contribution fits in the market for first-
year Property casebooks. I n  short, Property: Principles and Policies
represents an important advance in property pedagogy. B y  focusing
thematically on exclusion's efficiency, Merrill and Smith have captured
many important features of property overlooked by other casebooks.
My longer-range aim is to advance the reclamation project Merrill
and Smith have begun, by clarifying further the work that exclusivity
does in property law. Property: Principles and Policies brings contem-
porary scholarship a  long way toward appreciating the virtues o f
exclusivity, but there is still a long way to go. Merr ill and Smith con-
ceive of property at its core as a right to exclude others from a thing.
Others of  us sympathetic to property's exclusive tendencies prefer to
conceive of property as a right exclusively to determine a thing's use
 BUNDLES, TH1NGS, AND CASEBOOKS
Property. Principles and Policies portrays the foundational issues
in the first-year property course in terms of  a conflict between two
different theoretical conceptions of property. The book's h y p o
t h e s i sat "property at its core entails the right to exclude others from some
discrete thing." (P. v.) Although this claim needs elarificati 1. tor  tne
time being I will call it the "thing" or "thing-ownership" conception of
property. According to the alternative, all possible organizing concep-
tions for property are "so riddled with qualifications that property can
only be regarded as an ad hoc 'bundle of rights' without any distinguish-
ing features." ( I d )  Here, IVIerrill and Smith tacitly distinguish their
book from virtually all of its rivals, which refer to property as "a number
of disparate rights, a 'bundle' of them: the p o s s e s s ,  the right to
use, the right to exclude, the right to transfer, m  this Essay, I refer to































Although Merr ill, Smith, and their competitors a ll agree that
the thing versus ad hoc bundle contrast is significant, it is surprisingly
difficult to specify what the contrast really means. k  though 4eml1 and
Smith's contrast seems to frame a conceptual disagreement, the thing and
ad hoc bundle conceptions probably serve as shorthands for different
normative accounts of property, Merr ill and Smith are presuming as true
and useful what might be called "applied" or "apologetic" conceptual
theory. Since applied or apologetic conceptual theory sound like contra-
2, See infra part V.
.TESSE DUKEMINIER A L . ,  tOPERTf ,  n.2 (6th ed. 2006),
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dictions in terms, let us consider Merrill and Smith's contrast more
closely.
More so than other foundational fields o f  private law, property
contains a tension between foundations and expertise. T o  push assets
into private ownership, property law often endows owners with coarse
and undifferentiated packages of use rights. The owner of land has near-
total discretion to decide who may or may not enter his land, and a
broad domain o f  discretion to decide how to use the land among
many undelineated uses. T h a t  background discretion may facilitate
further private ordering. The owner may use her land as the sole asset
for a real estate development company, assign equity in the company to
investors, mortgage the land to secure debt, or subdivide the land into
smaller parcels and then impose reciprocal servitudes on all of the subdi-
vided parcels. Specialized terms also facilitate government regulation
more intricate than common law and private ordering would allow—like
zoning or environmental regulations.
The competing needs for coarseness and granularity create a tension
which Merrill and Smith have analogized to a pyramid. The "problem of
order" lays the "base" o f  the pyramid, while "the maximization o f
welfare" sits at the "apex."
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avoided in academic property scholarship. One is to analyze property
issues strictly in terms o f  foundational priorities without explaining
how complex arrangements build on simple foundations. The other is to
focus on all o f  the considerations that make a specialized issue o f
property distinct, abstracting away from foundational priorities. I n  this
Essay, I refer to that latter tendency as the "instrumentalist" tendency.
When judges and academic property lawyers refer to property as a
bundle of rights, many of them use the bundle metaphor as conceptual
shorthand for an implicit normative claim: that policy analysis may treat
property as an instrument for directly promoting immediate policy goals,
without disrupting property's foundational functions. N o t  all do, but
enough do that other lawyers know what the former mean when they use
the bundle metaphor the right way in the right contexts. Fo r example, in
a 1980 book on eminent domain, Bruce Ackerman views the first-year
Property course as means to inculcate instrumentalist policy instincts in
lawyers:
[Olne of the main points of the first-year Property course is to dis-
abuse entering law students of their primitive lay notions regarding
ownership.. Instead  of t h e  relationship between a person
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and 'his' things, property law discusses the relationships that arise
between people with respect to things. More precisely, the law of
property considers the way rights to use things may be parceled out
amongst a host of competing resource users.
5According to Ackerman, it  is imprecise to assume that an asset must
have a single "owner" and more precise to speak o f  her as one o f
several resource users who happens to have especially strong interests in
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to use things—making these decisions all the while by focusing on the
immediate claims of the claimants and not the more general and diffuse
foundational priorities associated with thing-ownership. T h e  ad hoc
bundle conception implicit in this passage facilitates and reflects the sort
of "expert-oriented view" at which Merrill and Smith are aiming.
7 Many leading policy-oriented casebooks illustrate Ackerman's
general approach.
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cies, and Practices? The book's opening guide assumes "[o]wners of
property generally possess a bundle of entitlements," and signals that the
book is generally sympathetic to normative theories it clusters together as
"social relations" theories, which examine "the role property rights play
in structuring social relations" and vice versa.
m S o c i a l - r e l a t i o n s  
t h e o r i e s
se the bundle conc ption to make property an instrument for equalizing
power r lati ns between sexes, among races, among people of different
conomic backgrounds, and in relation to other similar classifications.
Social-relations theory presupposes that property does and should
consist of an ad hoc bundle of rights. Property Law's epigraph comes
from a criminal-trespass opinion, State v. Shack.
11 I n  S h a c k ,  t h e  
N e w5. BRUCE A .  ACKERMAN,  PRIVATE PROPERTY A ND T HE CONSTITUTION 2 6  (1977) .  F o r  a
contemporaneous book review regarding Ackerman's book as a harbinger of  trends like those
discussed in the text, see Richard A. Epstein, The Next Generation of Legal Scholarship?, 30 STAN.
L. REV. 635 (1978) (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra).
6. See ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 11.
7. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 Wm. 8t MARY L.
REV. 1849,1866-67 & n.66 (2007).
8. For another example besides the examples considered in the text, see JOHN E. CRIBBET ET
AL., PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (9th ed. 2008) (questioning "what is meant by referring to
Mary as the 'owner' of [a] car," and suggesting it is "more realistic to refer to specific enforceable
claims by Mary regarding the car").
9. JOSEPH W I LLI A M  SINGER,  PROPERTY LAW :  RULES,  POLICIES, A ND PRACTICES ( 4t h ed.
2006).
10. Id at XXXiX, xlix (emphases removed).
I L  See id. at xi (quoting State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369,372 (N.J. 1971)). Singer's casebook is
not the only casebook to make the move described in text. See, e.g., CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 8,
at 36 (using Shack to question l al t  what point should an individual's right to exclude others give
way to claims and interests of other persons and of society").
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Jersey Supreme Court construed a farm owner's possessory interest in
control narrowly, so he could not institute a trespass action against two
government-funded migrant advocates who entered his property to meet
a migrant worker he was housing on the farm.
I2 T o  j u s t i f y  
t h i s  
h o l d i n g ,
the court balanced the interests that justified the owner's claim to exclu-
sion against the advocates' interests in doing their jobs and the migrants'
interests in humane treatment." The ad hoc bundle conception frames
the legal issue so that the farmer's claim to exclude the advocates has no
necessary relation to his rights to exclude competitors, squatters, or
thieves. That conceptual framing subtly shifts the burden to the farmer.
The advocates need not explain why they deserve to enter the farmer's
land; he needs to explain why he deserves to exclude them.
A similar tendency occurs in economic writings on property, as one
can see from consulting the Dukeminier-Krier casebook, Proper ty
14Property's presentation o f  nuisance illustrates important tendencies
in mainline law and economics scholarship.
15 P r o p e r t y  
p r o f e s s e s  
s k e p t i -
cism that nuisance has any internal coherence. I n  the introductory
materials to the nuisance chapter, the editors ask, "Suppose two neigh-
bors are engaged in incompatible land uses, such that if  A gets his way B
can't get her way, and vice versa. Sic  utere gets you nowhere."
I6 T h i squestion frames the property interests in nuisance in the same terms in
which Ronald Coase framed them in The Problem of Social Cost," and
in which Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed did in Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability.
18 T h e  
D u k e m i n i e r - K r i e r  
c a s e -
book, like those works, assumes that the primary phenomena are
"incompatible la d uses." That framing leads the casebook, throughout
the rest of the chapter, to ask how economic analysis might maximize the
joint product of the two competing resource uses.
°
12. See Shack, 277 A.2d at 372-74.
13. See id. at 373-74.
14. The text refers to the "Dukeminier-Krier" book because Property's living co-editors think
the book "will always be" Dukeminier's. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at vii.
15. See. e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.6, at 5 0
-
5 5  ( 7 t h  e d .
2007); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 91
-
96  ( 2 d  e d .  1 9 8 9 ) .
16. DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 639. Sic utere refers to sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, or "use your own in such a manner that you don't harm another's." See id.
17. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. I (1960).
18. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabil-
ity: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
19. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 642-44, 648-49, 654-56. "Joint product"
here refers to the sum of the values of the two productive uses, minus the negative externalities each
inflicts on the other and any transaction costs. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS JAEN, LAW &
ECONOMICS 85-98 (3d ed. 2000).
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A more comprehensive analysis would consider not only  the
parties' joint product but also the incentives legal rules would have on
the judicial system and on all other parties that might be affected by the
dispute's precedent. Some authorities, in that spirit, prefer to conceive
of "use" as a zone, marked off by physical boundary rules, and propor-
tionate to a land lot's size, which transfers to the owner policy control to
decide how to use the land among a wide range of unenumerated uses.
mPost-Coasean and Cathedral economic analysis, however, prefers to fo-
cus on the specific competing uses, because doing so allows the analysis
to focus on fairly concrete, focused phenomena closely associated with
the parties in dispute.
21 Readers may object to the observations made thus far on the ground
that the bundle of rights metaphor cannot make any normative claims.
The bundle conception often refers to a formal analytical vocabulary,
which consists of a series of pairs of rights and correlative obligations
(claim-rights and duties, liberties and exposures, and so on) associated
with Wesley Hohfeld and a  lis t o f  specific incidents o f  ownership
associated with Tony Honore (use, disposition, income, and so forth).
22This vocabulary is useful because it provides a language specifying what
legal rights and obligations a particular property doctrine creates in terms
of the precise obligations and parties.
23 B e c a u s e  i t  
i s  a  
s p e c i fi c a t i o
n
languag , the Hohfeld-Honore vocabulary cannot do justificatory work.
24
20. S e, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Con-
straints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).
21. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and
Natural Property Rights (George Mason Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Research Paper No.
08-20, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.comisol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1117999.
22. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions in Legal Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28-59 (1913), reprinted in WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL
LEG AL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL LEG AL REASONING 3 5
-
6 4  ( W a l t e r  W h e e l e r  
C o o k  e d . ,
Greenwood Press 1978) (1919); A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). Honore's contribution may not actually support the claim in the text.
As Merrill and Smith point out, Ownership is compatible with and premised on the assumption that
"there is one correct meaning of property." (P. 16.)
23. See, e.g., STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 19 (1990) (praising the analytical
vocabulary associated with the bundle for its "intellectual clarity, rigor, and power").
24. See id at 18; Stephen R. Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36, 45-46 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). In previ-
ous scholarship, I have not considered seriously enough the objections set forth in this paragraph.
See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, The Penn Central Test and Tensions in Liberal Property Theory, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 339, 354 (2006); Eric R. Claeys, Takings: An Appreciative Retrospective, 15 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 447-51 (2006) [hereinafter "Claeys, Takings Retrospectivel; Eric R.
Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 187, 203-20
(2004). The account set forth in this Part supersedes those discussions. I n  short, generalizations I
make about the "bundle of rights" conception in those works are appropriately directed toward what
I call here the "ad hoc bundle of rights" conception.
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For example, the earliest usage of the term "bundle" of which I am aware
comes from John Lewis's Treatise on the Law of  Eminent Domain.
25Lewis argues that the government condemns property whenever i t
removes any stick from the bundle.
26 I f  t h e  
b u n d l e  
c o n c e p t i o n  
w e r e  
a s
tied as thoroughly to instrumentalist policy analysis as I have suggested
to this point, Lewis could not have used it.
Merrill and Smith do not deal with this objection explicitly, but I
read them to finesse it. Mer r ill and Smith aim not at the bundle meta-
phor pure and simple, but rather at the ad hoc bundle conception of
property.
27 
A s  
I E .  
P e
n n



































tive on property is  entirely innocuous i f  regarded merely as an
elaboration of the scope of action that ownership provides."
28 M e r r i l land Smith seem to agree, by refraining from contrasting their thesis with
a bundle conception pure and simple. They seem to be targeting judicial
opinions like Shack and academic scholarship like social-relations or
post-Coasean economic scholarship, in which the bundle metaphor does
covert normative work. O f  course, conceptual philosophers may still
think Merrill and Smith's targets in the law and the law reviews (and
Merrill and Smith themselves) are using philosophical concepts badly.
Yet, since Merrill and Smith are writing a casebook, they must take
foundational property law and scholarship as it  is—not in the pristine
form in which conceptualists would like it to be.
To avoid confusion, this Essay uses the following conventions.
When speaking of  the bundle metaphor as a value-neutral analytical
specification vocabulary, this Essay refers to "the Hohfeld-Honore
vocabulary." When referring to lawyers or scholars who argue, like
Lewis, that property should include any valuable r ight that could
conceivably belong in the bundle, this Essay refers to the "coordinated
bundle conception." My  main focus here, however, is on a third concep-
tion—which, following Merrill and Smith, I  call the ad hoc bundle
conception. In part, this conception assumes or states a conceptual claim
25. JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES § 55,
at 43 (1888) ("The dullest individual among the people knows and understands that his property in
anything is a bundle of rights."). On the earliest reference to the bundle metaphor, see GREGORY S.
ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 1776-1970, at 455 n.40 (1997).
26. See LEWIS, supra note 25, § 56, at 45 ("whenever the lawful rights of  an individual to the
possession, use or enjoyment of his land are in any degree abridged or destroyed by reason of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, his property is, pro tanto, taken").
27. P. v (emphasis added).
28. IE.  Penner, The "Bundle of  Rights" Picture of  Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 741
(1996).
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that "property" is a nominalist concept.
29 I n  p a r t ,  
t h e  a d  
h o c  
b u n d l e
conception reflects a common tendency in a diverse collection of legal
materials to use the bundle metaphor to frame policy issues in ways that
facilitate instrumentalist normative arguments.
CHANGING TRENDS
Most leading first-year property casebooks reflect the instrumental-
ist tendencies that Merrill and Smith identify with the ad hoc bundle
conception. Over the last generation, however, property scholarship has
changed in ways that have created an opening for a new property case-
book. L a w  and economics is more respectable now than it  was an
academic generation ago. Although other property casebooks cover law
and economics, there now exists a market for a casebook that uses
economics as the main analytical tool for critiquing property law.
313 Separately, property scholarship has become more sympathetic
to expansive conceptions o f  property. F o r  example, Richard Epstein
published Takings, which, among other things, resuscitated and
explained classical-liberal assumptions about property already latent in
American common law. A s  John Lewis had, Epstein argued that the
state condemned property whenever it extinguished any specific right of
ownership in an owner's coordinated bundle of rights.
31 Separately, non-property law and economic scholarship has become
more solicitous of expansive property rights. New institutional econo-
mists have explained how particular societies developed property rights
for particular resources, or how property rights evolved to keep up with
legal and economic developments.
32 E c o n o m i c  
s t u d i e s  
o f  
r e g u l a t i
o n
have raised seri us public-choice objections to the claim, implic it in
29. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: Nomos XXII 69,
81 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (concluding that "Nile substitution of  a
bundle-of-rights for  a thing-ownership conception of property has the ultimate consequence that
property ceases to be an important category i n legal and political theory"); Barry Hoffmaster,
Between the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the Moore Case, 7 INTELL.
PROP. J. 115, 130 (1992) ( "A strategy that begins by defining the 'essence' of  property and then
applies this definition to the facts i s  fallacious because i f there are any essentialist concepts at all,
property is not one of them.").
30. See, e.g., Andrew P. Morriss, Review of  Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, Property
(Ith Edition 1998), 22 SEATFLE U. L. REV. 997, 1008 (1999) (book review) (complaining that
Dukeminier & Krier "pay little attention to the new, expanded approach to the economic analysis of
the definition of property rights' associated with the new institutional economics").
31. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 35-158 (1985); Claeys, Takings Retrospective, supra note 24, at 451
-
52.
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ECON. 163 (1975). See also HANDBOOK OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (Claude Menard
& Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005).
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much instrumentalist economic scholarship, that political processes can
direct how an asset is used without creating substantial rent-seeking
or seriously diminishing productive use of  the asset.
33 I n  e c o n o m i c s ,Friedrich Hayek argued that property was best understood as a clear set
of legal and social "expectations des ignat ing  r a n g e s  of objects
over which only particular individuals are allowed to dispose and from
the control o f  which all others are excluded."
34 C u m u l a t i v e l y ,  
t h e s e
various fields have suggested that owners are more productive with
assets when the law endows owners with broad zones of control than
when rights are "dictated from central authorities with less stake in the
outcome.1935
More recently, conceptual philosophers have proposed serious
alternatives to the definition of property as a bundle of rights. Although
J.W. Harris contributed importantly to this project,
36 I  w i l l  f o l l o w  
M e r r i l l
and Smith, who focus more here on the work of LE. Penner.
37 T o  t h eextent the bundle conception claims to be more than a specification
jargon, Harris and Penner argued, it is problematic. The bundle concep-
tion is best at explaining specific examples of property rights and duties,
but it is much less effective at explaining how owners and strangers both
use property to process particular rights and duties without needing to
keep tedious lists in hand.
38 F o r  
e x a m p l e ,  
p r i n c i p a
l s '  
a n d  
a g e n
t s '  
o b l i
g a -
tions to one another may vary considerably depending on particular
circumstances. By  contrast, the owner of a car does not need to have any
dealings with non-owners to reasonably expect that they will refrain from
stealing his car.
39 T h e  
H o h f e l
d -

















the relevant relations in both cases. But that vocabulary misses funda-
mental facts. The term "property" structures the duties strangers owe an
owner to apply more crudely and widely than the duties an agent owes a
33. See, e.g., ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION (1971); Richard A. Posner, Theories
of  Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sa. 335 (1974).
34.1 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 107 (1973).
35. TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD WEST 8 (2004).
36. See J.W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE (1996); J.W. Harris, Reason or Mumbo Jumbo:
The Common Law's Approach to Property, 117 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 445 (2002).
37. J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW (1997); Penner, supra note 28. Penner and
Harris were not the first to consider property from this perspective. For  example, Munzer, who uses
the Honore-Hohfeld vocabulary, see supra note 23, acknowledges that it "is as applicable to tort and
contract a s  it is to property," id. at 22, and that the "popular [thing] conception has a depth which
might be overlooked," id at 74. That said, Harris and Penner drew stronger implications from the
lay or thing perspective than previous scholarship had.
38. HARRIS, supra note 36, at 63-99; Harris, supra note 36, at 460.
39. See PENNER, supra note 37, at 75-76. Penner applies to the institution of property Joseph
Raz's account of  exclusionary reasons for  action and abstention. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL
REASON AND NORMS 33-47 (2d ed. 1990), cited in PENNER, supra note 37, at 7-10.
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principal; and property operates by signaling to strangers that they should
abstain from using owners' assets.
Elaborating from insights like these, Harris and Penner proposed
definitions o f  property stressing property's exclusionary tendencies.
Harris defined property as a combination of core trespassory rules and a
more nebulous "spectrum" of use interests an owner might claim in the
object of  trespassory protection.
° P e n n e r  
d e fi n e d  
p r o p e r t y  
a s  
a  
l e g a
l
right to exclude others from things.
41 T h i s  r i g h t  
i s  i n  
r e m ,  
n o t  
i n
personam, which is to say that non-owners discharge their duty to abstain
from an asset not by dealing directly with the owner but rather by
keeping away from the thing. Even if  1,000 passers-by each owe a car
owner the same Hohfeldian duty to refrain from stealing his car, all
discharge it by internalizing a social norm not to take cars they do not
own.42
These developments have challenged both aspects of the claim that
property consists of an ad hoc bundle of rights. On the conceptual side,
the fact that people manage to steer around the ownership rights o f
neighbors and strangers lends credibility to the idea that property can be
organized around a simple concept like exclusion or exclusivity. On the
economic side, property rights may be designed more for concerns at the
base than for concerns at the apex of the proverbial pyramid. Merr ill and























































IV PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES VERSUS THE AD HOC BUNDLE
Property: Principles and Policies is organized around a tension
between foundational ordering and expertise, which Merrill and Smith
describe as "exclusion" and "governance." "Under an exclusion strat-
egy, decisions about resource use are delegated to an owner who acts as
the manager or gatekeeper of the resource," while governance "focuses
on particular uses o f  resources, and prescribes particular rules about
permitted and prohibited uses without regard to the other attributes of the
resource." (P. 29.) In  Merrill and Smith's account, property establishes
"clarity at the core," for objects like land or cars, by endowing owners
with an in rem and largely undifferentiated right to exclude outsiders.
By contrast, there is "messiness at the perimeter" of  property, as the
40. HARRIS, supra note 36, at 5.
41. See PENNER, supra note 37, at 71; HARRIS, supra note 36, at 141-42 (defining property as
including interests protected by trespassory protections).
42. See PENNER, supra note 37, at 25-28.
43. Rather than cite all o f  that scholarship here, 1 wi l l  cite i t in footnotes relevant to particular
topics raised in Properly : Principles and Policies discussed hereafter.
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gains from intensive and coordinated resource management start to dwarf
the transaction costs of such management. (P. 22 .)
44 The book's first chapter illustrates this tension with basic trespass
and nuisance. Other casebooks have no thematic discussions of trespass;
the doctrine gets passing treatment in chapters on original acquisition
45or on general property theory.
46 B y  
c o n t r a s t ,  
P r o p e r t y :  
P r i n c i p
l e s  
a n
d
Policies starts with  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, I n c . ,
4 7  i n  w h i c h  t h eWisconsin Supreme Court affirms a  $100,000 punitive-damage award
for a harmless but intentional trespass. (See pp. 1-7.) A s  a foil, Merrill
and Smith present Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, which adds elements
to tr spa s to make it virtually impossible for land owners to enjoin high-
ltitude airplane overflights." I n  Jacque, the court insists that the right
to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that
are commonly characterized as property,"
49 a n d  w o r r i e s  
t h a t  
j e o p a r d i z i n g
this right threatens "the int grity of the legal system."'
° Y e t  i n  H i n m a n ,he court quietly limits the r ght to exclude.
Merrill and Smith explain the tension b y introducing the thing
and ad hoc bundle conceptions to students. Th e y introduce students to
Penner's stolen-car example and his definition o f  property as an in rem
right t o  exclude others f ro m a  thing. (S e e  pp. 16-17.) P ro p e rty
normally entitles an owner to security by imposing, on the hundreds or
thousands of strangers likely to interact with her thing, a "strict liability"
duty that is simple and easy to follow. (P .  7.) Because the duty is in
rem, the strangers do not need to interface with the owner to discharge it.
Of  course, sometimes boundary rules need to give way to coordinated
resource management for multiple parties. Hence Hinman. Th is dichot-
omy does not explain all o f  trespass. I  am puzzled, for example, why
Merrill and Smith do not consider whether State v. Shack presents a case
at the core (in which case it was wrongly decided) or at the perimeter (in
which case it was correctly decided).
51
44. See also Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985); Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 394-97; Smith, supra note
20.
45. See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 86-93.
46. See CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 8, at 35-43.
47. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997).
48. Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936), excerpted pp. 9-13.
49. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159-60 (quoting Dolan v. City of  Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384
(1994)).
50...Jacque, 563 N.W.2c1 at 160.
51. See pp. 405-08. For  my doubts about Shack, see Eric R. Claeys, Virtue and Rights in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. (No. 4, forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 149-55,
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjd=1331493).
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In any case, Merrill and Smith use the same tension to explain an-
other foundational principle—property presumes injunctions ("property
rules") but leaves room for damages-only remedies ("liability rules") in
extreme cases.
52 
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i o n s  
r e d




















owners must expend to understand what they need to do to abstain from
owners' assets. Equity may balance interests when the facts of a case tip
strongly in the other direction; as a first cut, however, the law enforces in
rem exclusion by presuming that the law enjoins ongoing trespasses.
(See pp. 53-55.) I f  these principles seem obvious, they are not—at least,
not to students who learn that property consists of an ad hoc bundle of
rights to be assigned in an instrumentalist fashion. For  example, other
leading casebooks do not discuss in substantial detail the standards for
getting an injunction after a trespass.
53 Merrill and Smith carry the same tension forward to their discus-
sion of nuisance. I n  instrumentalist authorities, nuisance serves as a
metaphor for the principle that property requires judges or regulators to
choose between two conflicting resource uses. Post-Coasean economic
scholarship exhibits this tendency, but so does the Restatement (Second)
of Torts. The Restatement marks off any disturbance that could possibly
annoy a land owner as a potential nuisance; to determine whether it is a
legal nuisance, fact finders must balance the competing uses through
utilitarian interest balancing.
54 S o m e  
p r o m i n e n t  
c a s e b o
o k s  
f o l l
o w  
t h
e
Restatement lit rally. O ne book gives students a dispute between an
owner who wants to add a second story to his house and a neighbor who
will lose solar energy after the addition is built. The notes encourage
readers to ask how they would balance seven pages of arguments about
development, conservation, and other factors relevant to the dispute.
55 In practice, however, nuisance cases are decided much more often
by appeal to boundary-driven exclusion principles. Mer r ill and Smith
drive this point home with the private-nuisance case Hendricks v.
Stalnaker.
56 
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part to preempt Hendricks, with help from local zoning rules, from
installing a septic tank on his adjacent property.
57 D u t i f u l l y  c i t i n g  
t h e
52. Cf Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18.
53. See CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 8, at 679-91; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 646-65
(both discussing remedies in nuisance without any preceding substantial discussion of remedies in
trespass).
54. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 821D, 825-28 (1979).
55. See SINGER, supra note 9, § 4.4, at 309-16 (citing Prah v. Mareni, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis.
1982)).
56.380 S.Eld 198 (W. Va. 1989), excerpted pp. 23-27.
57. Under local regulations, septic systems and water wells could not be closer than 100 feet
apart. See id at 199-200, quoted pp. 23-24.
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Restatement, the opinion announces that nuisance requires "a balancing
of the landowners' interests."
58 Y e t ,  
H e n d r i c k s  
d o e s  
n o t  
c o n d u
c t  
a
serious cost-benefit analysis—it instead reverses a  jury  verdict for
endricks with instructions to dismiss his complaint. (See p. 27.) The
court's interest balancing really consists of little more than the applica-
tion o f  a simple boundary rule: Hendrick's "septic system, with its
potential for  drainage, places a  more invasive burden on adjacent
property" than Stalnaker's wel1.
59 The term "invasive" is extremely revealing. Even though it cited
the Restatement, the Hendricks court actually conceived of the posses-
sory interest in nuisance as an in rem zone of exclusive policy control.
To mark off that zone, nuisance law makes anything that is a "mini-
trespass" a presumptive nuisance, and then qualifies that presumption to
conform to "the general understanding in the relevant community of
what constitute 'normal uses' of  land." (P. 28.) Thus, access-to-light
cases get thrown out as a threshold matter because they lack a physical
invasion. (See p. 947•
60 L i g h t  
c a s e s  
c a n n o
t  
b e  
s e t t






grained interest-balancing. Such balancing is often "too subjective to
serve as th  basis for  a rule o f  property law" (p. 28) and imposes
"decisional costs t o o  high." (Teacher's Manual p. 21.)
Merrill and Smith's organizing theme also helps them bring out
interesting policy issues in areas of property that tend to resist policy
analysis. For  example, even in more theoretical casebooks, high theory
usually takes a break in the chapters on estates and future interests.
Students need to learn these rules, but most professors and books assume
that the rules "have no better reason t h a n  that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV."
61 
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sympathetic explanation. I f  property is going to be in rem, strangers
need to be able to process easily what estates and interests the owners
hold, and recipients o f  property need to know what rights they are
getting. These needs limit the present possessory estates to a few simple
and familiar forms, including the fee simple, the life estate, and the
leasehold. (See pp. 576-95.) 62
Some teachers assume that any casebook that stresses policy must
not take doctrine seriously. I  would not make this assumption about any
58. Id at 202 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1979)), quoted p. 25.
59. Id, quoted p. 26.
60. Accord Mohr v. Midas Realty Co., 431 11.W.2d 380 (Iowa 1988); Sher v. Leiderman, 226
Cal. Rptr. 698 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Green v. Castle Concrete Co., 509 1
3
. 2d 5 8 8  ( C o l o .  1 9 7 3 ) .
61. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 1
0 H A R V .  L .  R E V .  
4 5 7 ,  4 6 9  
( 1 8 9 7 ) .
62. See Thomas W. Merrill &  Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization i n the Law o f
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLIN. L. REV. 773 (2001).
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of the well-established property casebooks, and I  would not make it
about Property: Principles and Policies. Chapter in t ro d u c t io n  o f the
injunction/damages choice is presented not only to introduce the theory
behind the Cathedral but also to make sure that students get some
exposure to equity, while they are s till learning foundational legal
concepts in their first year. Chapter 8, on recording, provokes a rich
discussion when the law needs centralized records. (Consistent with the
exclusion/governance continuum, low-value and fungible assets do not
need records, but high-value and non-fungible ones do. (See pp. 900–
17)) Before getting there, however, Merrill and Smith start with the
common law default principle nemo dat quod non habet—"no one can
give that which he does not have." (P. 884.) Merr ill and Smith slip in a
foundational lesson for the future practitioner here, about how statutes
build on and interact with the common law.
By focusing so much on the exclusion/governance continuum,
Property: Principles and Policies suffers where this continuum is not
really relevant to the doctrine. For example, many other casebooks start
with acquisition.
63 
S u b s t a n
t i v e l y ,  
l a n
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and exclusionary ownership, and water to usufructuary rights. These
generalizations are contingent on economics and social context which
come out in sound discussions o f  acquisition.
64 B e c a u s e  
P r o p e r t y :
Principl s and Polici s is organized around exclusion, however, such
questions are treated in a fragmented manner.
The acquisition of land, chattels, and property in ideas is covered in
Chapter 2, on "original acquisition." (Pp. 81-164.) Yet Chapter 2 also
covers several important rules o f  secondary acquisition: accession,
finding, and adverse possession. (Pp. 165-242.) By  contrast, the rules
for acquiring property interests in water and spectrum are covered in
Chapter 3, on "values subject to private ownership." (Pp. 349-92.) 1 am
left wondering why Property: Principles and Policies did not organize
these topics to track the underlying theoretical issues. A l l  the same,
eachers do not need to follow the book's organization in lockstep.
Moreover, the modules on each topic are quite attentive to the subtleties
along the border between public and private resources. F or  example,
Merrill and Smith enrich the materials on first possession by excerpting
from the new institutional-economics scholarship on "open access,"
63. See, e.g., BARLOW BURKE ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF PROPERTY LAW 1-6 (2d ed. 2004);
DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at 3-86; SINGER, supra note 9, at 3-102.
64. See, e.g., Robert C. Hickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE Li . 1315 (1993).
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"common property," and other forms o f  public commons.
65 O n e  g e m  o fthe b o o k  i s Me r r i l l  a n d  Smith 's systematic treatment o f  th e
phenomenon o f  accession, whereby the law assigns ownership o f  one
resource (a calf or air space) to the owner of a second resource in close
proximity to the first (a cow or the ground, respectively). (Pp. 165-94.)
Accession reflects a deep preference in  the law to get relatively value-
less, but potentially valuable, assets out o f  the public realm and into
private ownership.
Taking a l l  the different parts o f  the book together, however,
Property: Principles and Policies' focus on exclusion is an asset. Exclu-
sion explains many foundational areas o f  property law that get short
shrift o r  unsympathetic treatment in  other casebooks that start f rom
instrumentalist normative premises.
V. THING-OWNERSHIP AS AN ANALYTICAL CONCEPT
In the course of making exclusion respectable, Merrill and Smith
have opened up a new round o f  questions about what exactly exclusion
and thing-ownership mean. Me rr i l l  and Smith are economists using a
"thing" conception in  the course o f  normative economic arguments.
When one is evaluating their project, one must treat it as one would treat
scholarly arguments that draw on the ad hoc bundle metaphor—separate
the conceptual claim from the normative claim and treat each on its own
terms. Th is  Part critiques the conceptual claims conceptually, and Part
VI focuses p rimarily
66  o n  
c r i t i q u i n
g  
t h e  
n o r m a
t i v e  
c l a
i m s  
e c o n
o m i c
a l l y
.
A. Exclusivity: Traditional Conceptions
I disagree with  Merrill and Smith that thing-ownership may be
reduced to an owner's right to exclude others from his thing. Instead, I
prefer to say that property refers to a right to determine exclusively how
a thing may be used.
°
65. See Thrainn Eggertson, Open Access versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS:
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW (Terry L. Anderson &  Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003),
excerpted pp. 95-99.
66. To avoid unnecessary repetition of  examples, Part VI  also illustrates the conceptual
criticisms explained in Part V. But Part VI focuses primarily on normative economic issues.
67. I borrow this phrase from PENNER, supra note 37, at 49, but I may be using i t differently
from the manner in which I read him to be doing so. As I understand Penner, he uses this definition
to describe the normative interest that social and legal property vindicates. However, when a society
reduces that interest to laws or social norms, it does so by vesting in owners rights to exclude others
from their things. See, e.g., id. at 103 (defining the right of property as "the right to determine the
use or  disposition of  a thing in so far  as that can be achieved or  aided by others excluding
themselves from i t"  (emphasis added)). The social—legal interests are, therefore, more binary and
boundary-driven than the normative interests they seek to protect. M y  agreements and disagree-
ments with Penner will need to be elaborated elsewhere.
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Consider a  definition o f  property from a  time when thing-
ownership was a much more settled feature o f  property law: "that
dominion or indefinite right of  user and disposition which one may
lawfully exercise over particular things or subjects, and generally to the
exclusion of all others."
68 I n  t h i s  
d e fi n i t i o n
,  
t h e  
c o r
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o f  
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owner's "dominion" or  "indefinite r ight o f  user and disposition."
Dominio  connotes a zone of policy control ( if one is a social scientist),
or a domain of practical discretion ( if one stays closer to case law and
everyday language
69
). I n  
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with freedom within which to deploy the property to any of a wide range
of uses. Adam Mossoff calls this domain a "right of use," consistent
with early Enlightenment property theory.
7() L a r i s s a  K a t z  
c a l l s  
t h e
domain "agenda-setting,"
71 p r o b a b l y  
o  
a v o i d  
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sense of Coasean individualized-use entitlements.
This conception of property is not the only way to describe property
as a social concept and, as a result, it has its limitations. A t  the same
time, I doubt alternative definitions can hang together without reference
to an owner's interest in determining the use of an asset. O n  the one
hand, when the "bundle" metaphor is used to refer to a coordinated and
robust set o f  property rights rather than a  normative c laim about
property, exclusive use determination explains why all o f  the various
rights that go into the bundle belong there. Analytically , a bundle
conception can both explain why any slice of pizza is still "pizza," and
describe and account for all the slices of a single pizza even i f  those
slices come in different shapes and sizes. Yet one needs a separate defi-
ition of  "pizza" to determine whether a bagel pizza or any slice of it
really counts as "pizza." So too with property. I n  isolation, the bundle
conception does not explain why any one bundle is peculiarly a bundle of
property rights. Blackstone defined property as a bundle, as the "free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of all [of an owner's] acquisitions, without
any control or diminution, save only by the laws of the land."
72 B u t  h ebalanced that definition by also defining property as "sole and despotic
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
68.  19 T HE AMERI CAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW  284 (John Hous t on M er r i l l  ed. ,
1892).
69. See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 168 (1988) ("right to choose
which of a number of possible uses shall be made of" the asset).
70. Adam Mossoff, What Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV.
371, 396 (2003).
71. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 278 &
n.9 (2008).
72.  W I LLI AM BLACKSTONE,  1 COMMENTARIES ON T HE LAWS OF ENG LAND *
1 3 4  ( W i l l i a m  S .Hein & Co., 1992)(1765).
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of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual.""
Exclusive use determination provides at the core o f  property what
Honore calls the "delineation e s s e n t ia l  i n  order that it may be
possible to assess the strength of the analogies in the peripheral cases."
74 On the other hand, exclusive use determination gives conceptual
focus to the "exclusion" in a right to exclude. In the encyclopedia defini-
tion that opened this Part, "exclusion" is  not necessary to property;
it is only "generally" a feature of property. Moreover, property exclu-
sion does not exclude non-owners from the res or thing, but rather from
the "dominion or indefinite right of user or disposition" associated with
the thing:
15 
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as they make clear when they treat the Blackstone definition just quoted
above. Blackstone makes the operative noun "dominion."
76 E x c l u s i o nexcludes others not from the thing, but from the owner's dominion over
the thing's use. Af ter  quoting Blackstone's definition verbatim, how-
ever, Merrill and Smith paraphrase him to mean "the right of an owner to
exclude others from her 'thing." (P. 393.) Dominion drops out and
exclusion goes out of an adverbial clause into the center of the defini-
tion."
An exclusive right of use determination has more focus and deter-
minacy than a right to exclude. Exclusive use determination describes
property as an interest. The bearer of such an interest enjoys a domain of
negative liberty ,
78 b u t  
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deploy ownable assets to most of the productive uses for which property
is typically used. By  contrast, a right to exclude from the thing merely
73.2 id. at *2.
74. Honore, supra note 22, at I l l .  Richard Epstein suggests that the bundle of rights concep-
tion is an analytically complete account of property. See Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of
Intellectual Property 7 (Univ. of  Chicago Law &  Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 423, 2008),
available at http://papers.ssm.comisol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1236273. Although the argument in
text requires more development than I  can give i t here, the text should suggest why 1 am not
persuaded.
75. Accord Katz, supra note 71, at 277-78 (distinguishing an owner's exclusive "position" in
relation to an object from the owner's power to exclude from the "object"); Mossoff, supra note 70,
at 396 (the right to exclude "is the right to exclude from the right of use"). The reservations Katz,
Mossoff, and 1 all draw toward about Merrill and Smith's definition of  property apply as well to
Harris's trespass-based definition of property. See notes 38 & 40 and accompanying text.
76. Some suggest that Blackstone did not mean this definition except as a hyperbolic first cut.
See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601
(1998); David Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 103
(2009). 1 doubt these critics appreciate sufficiently how Blackstone uses "dominion" as a term of
art.
77. See Mossoff, supra note 70, at 397-400.
78. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969), cited in PENNER, supra
note 37, at 50 n.48.
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states a particular outcome. I t  abstracts away from the general context
and principles that explain why the outcome is justified:
79 To appreciate the difference, consider the case study that launched
















































because department stores could not sell goods or  services without
getting prior approval of six different regulatory agencies.
81 H e l l e r  c a l l sthese collectives and agencies "owners" because they have property "in
the sense that they could block other rights-holders from using a store
without permission."
82 
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a right to exclude. The collectives and agencies are owners because they
may exclude the realowners from productive commercial use. However,
from Blackstone's perspective, Heller's classification makes a concep-
tual category mistake. T h e  agencies' rights to exclude cannot be
property rights because the exclusion does not protect any interest the
agencies have in making productive use of the stores.
Although this insight is conceptual and not normative, it illustrates
why sound concepts matter. As  Heller points out, Moscow's regulatory
system is simply indefensible. The system creates multiple hold-out
opportunities for parties who have nothing to contribute to the stores'
profitability. Yet a property system would grind to a halt if  it needed to
wait on academics like Heller to explain in great detail why the law
should not entitle the agencies with rights to exclude. When legal and
social actors internalize property as  an interest i n  exclusive use
determination, their conceptual priors automatically screen out veto or
blockade rights. The legal system should not need to expend substantial
administrative costs rejecting legal conceptions that will invite rent-
seeking with no corresponding payoff.
B. Exclusion: The Realist Transformation
Now, a right to exclude can refer merely to a formal analytical
right, without any necessary practical implications. A l l  the same, the
79. Stephen Munzer doubts that property is exclusive in this sense because joint tenants or
partners may "have legal interests in the same thing." MuNzER, supra note 23, at 89. Yet  the
co-owners, as a group, enjoy ownership and use exclusive from the rest of the world. Their  rights
and duties to one another are more complicated, but their relations with the outside world remain
property relations because of that exclusivity.
80.  See MI CHAEL HELLER,  T HE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: H o w  T oo  MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS
MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES, at x i v
-
x v  ( 2 0 0 8 ) ;  M i c h a e l  
A .  H e l l e r ,  
T h e
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV.
621 (1998).
81. Heller, supra note 80, at 637-40.
82. Id. at 636.
2009] I s  Property a Thing or a Bundle? 6 3 5
right to exclude can get co-opted to do normative work in  conceptual
clothing. Th e  Hohfeld-Honore vocabulary has been co-opted in instru-
mentalist property law and scholarship to become the ad hoc bundle.
The right to exclude was also co-opted by prominent Legal Realists.
This suggestion may sound surprising to contemporary property
scholars, who  often assume that the ad hoc bundle conception was
the only legacy from Realist property scholarship.
83 ( I n  t h e i r  
a c a d e m i c
scholarship, Merrill and Smith have popularized this assumption.
84
) Y e t
other Realists contributed another legacy, o f property as a formal right to
exclud . Th is  legacy is as susceptible to instrumentalist transformation
as the ad hoc bundle conception. I n  trying to avoid the problems they
see with ad hoc bundle theory, Merrill and Smith may not sufficiently
appreciate the limitations of Realist's right to exclude theory.
Anglo-American property law has conceived o f  property in terms
of dominion, indefinite user, or exclusive use determination in large part
because i t  was developed when (loosely speaking) Lockean natural-
rights theory shaped the law. According to this theory, property should
be designed to maximize owners' policy-making control for likely pro-
ductive uses o f property, consistent with similar owners enjoying similar
domains o f freedom for productive use.
85 I n  t h e  e a r l y  
t w e n t i e t h  
c e n t u r y ,
however, natural-rights theory came under severe criticism. Lead ing
American polit ic ans and  academics propounded n e w progressive
theories o f  government, which justified instrumentalist regulation o f
property and contract to a much greater degree than had natural-rights
theory.
86 
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Realists also sought to find a conceptual way to "smooth the way for
activist state intervention in regulating and redistributing property!"
87 One account came from Hohfeld's taxonomy o f  correlative rights
and duties. Hohfe ld  was not a Realist himself; he was a conceptualist
clarifying what he regarded as longstanding misconceptions in  legal
practice and in  analytical philosophy. Ho h fe ld  developed the formal
analytical vocabulary associated with the bundle o f  rights, even though
he is not known to have used that phrase h imself .
88 N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
l e a d -
83. See, e.g., Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. Si. L.1.
1075,1077-80 (1997).
84. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 363-65.
85. See Mossoff, supra note 70.
86. See I  RICHARD T. ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTIONS OF WEALTH 107 (1914); CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN
POLITICAL THEORIES 307 (1924).
87. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 365.
88. See ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 319 & n.24.
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ing Realists appropriated Hohfeld's conceptual work
89 a n d  u s e d  i t  
t o
justify interventioni t property regulation." We can all thank these Real-
ists for making respectable "applied" conceptual theory generally and the
ad hoc bundle conception particularly.
91 Other Realists, however, shied away from the ad hoc bundle con-
ception. As  Merrill and Smith recognize, the ad hoc bundle conception
justifies an "extreme nominalism" (Teacher's Manual p. 19), whereby
property becomes a "general term for the miscellany of  equities that
persons hold in the commonwealth."
92 T o  a v o i d  
t h a t  
t e n d e n c y ,  
i n  
T h e
Common Law, proto-Realist Oliver Wendell Holmes described the owner
as t e one who is "allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no
one.1193 According to Morris Cohen, "the law of  property helps me
directly only to exclude others from using the things which it assigns to
me.1194 In opposition to the nominalism he must have encountered
among other Realists, Felix Cohen concluded that "ownership is  a
particular kind of legal relation in which the owner has a right to exclude
the non-owner from something or other."" I n  contrast with the ad hoc
bundle conception, all three of these definitions preserve some "thing-
ness" to property.
When these Realists reconfigured property to focus on exclusion,
however, they diminished property's connection to productive use:
96 T oillustrate, consider how the three different conceptions apply to a simple
rent-control ordinance. Under the natural-rights regime, unless the state
had granted the owner-landlord an exclusive, legal monopoly in the
relevant rental market,
97 b o t h  
c o m m o n  
l a w  
a n d  
c o n s t i
t u t i o n





89. See, e.g., Arthur R. Corbin, Taxation of  Seats on the Stock Exchange, 31 YALE L.J. 429,
429 (1922) (asserting that "property'  has ceased to describe any res, or object of sense, at all, and
has become merely a bundle of legal relations—rights, powers, privileges, immunities").
90. See, e.g., Robert L. Hale, Rate Making and the Revision of  the Property Concept, 22
COLUM. L. REV. 209,214 (1922) (recasting "Wile right of ownership in a manufacturing plant" as "a
privilege to operate the plant, plus a privilege not to operate it, plus a r ight to keep others from
operating it, plus a power to acquire all the rights of ownership in the products").
91. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 1-4 (1936) (presenting as the foundation of
property law Holifeld's taxonomy of correlative legal relations).
92. See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton & Irene Till, Property, in 1
1 E N C Y C L O P E D I A  
O F  T H E  
S O C I A L
SCIENCES 528 (Edward R. A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1937).
93. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 246 (1881).
94. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignly, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 8.12 (1927).
95. Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357,370 (1954).
96. Adam Mossoff deserves credit for focusing attention on the Realist right to exclude theory,
and he has also suggested that this theory has important ramifications in patent law. See Mossoff,
supra note 70, at 395-97; Adam MossofT, Patents As Property: Conceptualizing the Exclusive
Right(s) in Patent Law, HARV. J. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssm.
comisol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1239182.
97. See. e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 147-54 (1876) (Field, J, dissenting). Natural-
rights principles might also justify rate regulation when an owner enjoys not a legal but still a natural
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sume that each property owner enjoys a broad right to "fix what price he
pleases upon his own property or the use of it."
98 B o t h  t h e  
g e n e r a l  
r i g h t
and the anti-monopoly exception advance the substantive end of natural-
rights theory—to encourage each owner productively to "make]] the
most of his own_"
99 
E x c l u s i v
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to this normative interest. The landlord has a right to set rent because he
has a more general and exclusive right to choose how to use his land.
Unless it  enforces the anti-monopoly proviso inherent in a landlord's
title, the rent-control ordinance takes the landlord's property.
By contrast, the ad hoc bundle conception complicates the analysis.
The owner loses a proverbial stick when the rent-control law caps his
maximum rent, but he is allowed to keep other sticks in his bundle—how
to use the lot, manage the premises exclusively, or negotiate rents below
the legal maximum. By  delineating the owner's entitlements, of course,
the ad hoc bundle conception does not determine whether the ordinance
takes property. That determination is not conceptual but normative. I n
the hands of an interventionist, however, the ad hoc bundle conception
accentuates the positive and eliminates the negatives. Reminding the
owner and the law of the rights the owner retains suggests that the owner
is being selfish to whine about the disposition rights being extin-
guished.
1131 








































the owner's lost disposition rights and rental income in context of the
owner's other possible sources of income.
At least in this hypothetical, the Realist right to exclude conception













































monopoly over a commercial service. However, some jurists who subscribed to natural-rights prin-
ciples rejected this possibility, see for example, People v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 684-89 (N.Y. 1889)
(Peckham, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Budd v. People, 143 U.S. 517 (1892), and we need not
consider it here.
98. Allnutt v. Inglis, 104 Eng. Rep. 206, 210 (1810) (opinion of Lord Ellenborough). See also
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 396 (1856) (opinion of Denio, J.) (deducing a general right of
commercial disposition from the ownership of property).
99. AlInuit, 104 Eng. Rep. at 208.
100. According to Penner, when property is defined as a right of exclusive use determination, it
need not cover the right to dispose of the asset or some portion of the asset by commercial transac-
tion. T hat  right can be covered by the social concept of  "contract" without coming under the
social concept of "property." See PENNER, supra note 37, at 91-92. Yet, Penner does not say that
"property" precludes commercial use and disposition, only that the concept of property does not
automatically cover commercial use and disposition. See id As  cases like Allnut suggest, natural-
rights poli tical morality shaped Anglo-American local  conceptions o f  property t o  cover
commercial use and disposition.
101. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
102. See Cohen, supra note 94, at 12-14; cl: Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) ( " i f to
answer one need the legislature may limit height to answer another it may limit rent").
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siders from the premises. The law might endow him with the right to
capture all the commercial potential o f  the apartment building, but it
could just as plausibly configure the landlord's rights to leave out the
potential for commercialization. The U.S. Supreme Court now calls the
"power to exclude o n e  of the most treasured strands in an owner's
bundle o f  property r ights ."
103 Y e t  
t h e  
C o u r t  
h a s —
u n a n i m o u
s l y —
construed this power not to cover the power to exclude tenants who do
not want to pay the rent the landlord wants to charge.
1°4 Exclusion has more content in  Property: Principles and Policies
than it did for Holmes or the Cohens. When these Realists spoke of
exclusion, they concentrated primarily on the blockade right Heller
called property in the hands of Moscow regulatory agencies.
1°5 M e r r i l land Smith construe exclusion to refer to boundaries and the incidents of
control and use protected by boundaries. Exclusion establishes a fence
and designates the owner the gatekeeper of everything within the fence.
(See p. 29.) A t  the same time, Property: Principles and Policies' rendi-
tion of exclusion still states an outcome and not an interest. Recall that
the right to exclude is only "the core case" for property (p. 22), while out
on the perimeter, exclusion gives way to welfare-maximizing governance
regimes. (Pp. 29- 30)
106 O n e  
a l w a y s  
n e e d
s  












area of property law lies at the core or out on the periphery. This  is a
tricky endeavor.
103. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982), excerpted
p. 1291.
104. See, e.g., Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992) (rejecting a per se physical-taking
challenge to a mobile-home-park rent-control ordinance); Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
But see Hall v. Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1986) (interpreting Loretto to
declare a rent-control ordinance a per se taking), abrogated by Yee, 503 U.S. 519.
105. To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The state
Cohen, supra note 95, at 374. Accord Katz, supra note 71, at 284-85.
106. The exclusion/governance distinction mentioned in text comes from Smith's scholarship.
See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 467-74 (2002). Merrill probably conceives of the right to exclude as a more
formal right, as shown here: "[T]he right to exclude others is a necessary and sufficient condition of
identifying the existence of property. Whatever other sticks may exist in a property owner's bundle
of rights in any given context, these other rights are purely contingent in terms of whether we speak
of the bundle as property." Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV.
730, 731 (1998).
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VI. THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE AS AN ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT
A. Overview
Perhaps I am nitpicking, or displaying what Merrill and Smith have
called "the grip o f conceptualism a n d  a slavish devotion to the gods
of Roman law_"
1°7  Y e t  
c o n c e
p t s  
m a t t
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Smith have diagnosed many areas where the ad hoc bundle conception
has "i troduce[d] b lind  spots" in  economic property scholarship.108
Property: Princip les a n d  Policies i s  a  path-breaking book simp ly
because it  corrects those blind spots in  the first-year Property course.
Most o f  those corrections l ie  a t  the base o f  Me rril l and Smith 's
proverbial pyramid. Whe re  their conception o f  the right to exclude is
i determinate, however, it creates distortions along the next layer imme-
diately above the base .
w9 In this Part, I  make two suggestions. Conceptually, a lawyer may
conceive of the same property interest differently, depending on whether
he assumes property consists of a right to exclude or a right of exclusive
use determination. Economically, these conceptual differences correlate
with an important economic debate about the economic value of auton-
omy. Reca ll that Hayek defined property in terms o f  exclusive use de-
terminat ion.
m 
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Smith's interpretations" I o f  the doctrine by stressing the roles that tem-
poral change, information disparities, and subjectivity problems play in
the allocation o f property righ ts.
112  A l t h o u g h  
t h e  
c o n c e p t u a
l  
a n d  
n o r m
-
tive suggestions should be kept separate,' 13 they st ill provide important
107. Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 359.
108. Id. at 375.
109. When I make substantive criticisms in this Part, I will articulate them in economic terms.
doubt that this terminology adds more clarity or determinacy than one can get from the common-
sense moral vocabulary in a lot of the case law, when that vocabulary is properly understood. See
Claeys, supra note 21, at 9-15,47-62. That said, since Property: Principles and Policies is Merrill
and Smith's casebook, I use their jargon and not mine.
110. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
I I I .   When, in this Part, I  make economic arguments, they should be understood in three
senses. First, they make explanatory claims about why doctrine is as it is. Second, they make plau-
sible normative arguments, which need to be road-tested by conformity to the cases and by more
general empirical verification. Third, they make contingent normative claims, assuming that subjec-
tivity, change i n response to changing conditions, and information asymmetries are the primary
factors determining economic efficiency.
112. See, e.g., ROY E. CORDATO, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXTERNALITIES IN AN OPEN
ENDED UNIVERSE: A  MODERN AUSTRIAN PERSPECTIVE 4
-
1 0  ( 1 9 9 2 ) ;  G E R A L D  
P .  
O ' D R I S C O L L  
&
MARIO J. RIZZO, THE ECONOMICS OF TIME AND IGNORANCE 1
-
7 0  ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
113. For example, a scholar could use a coordinated bundle conception to voice normative
concerns about the right to exclude similar to the ones I raise here. Richard Epstein makes this move
while critiquing J.W. Harris's account of  exclusion. See Richard A. Epstein, Weak and Strong
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reminders why questionable conceptual theory can introduce normative
blind spots.
B. Control and Use
The subtleties come out even in the foundational materials with
which Merrill and Smith begin. Consider Jacque, the snowdrift case,
and Hinman, the overflight case. Jacque is presented as an easy case, a
metaphor for the "clarity at the core" of property. (P. 22.) Ye t Jacque is
not that easy. Th e  case illustrates that trespass holds a trespasser liable
"irrespective of whether he thereby causes any harm to any legally pro-
tected interest of" the landowner.
114 I t  i s  
p u z z l i n g  
w h y  
t h e  
l a w  
e n d o w
s
owners with a right to exclude harmless boundary invasions.
Perhaps clear boundaries encourage owners to efficiently exploit
the commercial potential in their land and non-owners to efficiently con-
ract with owners.
115 T h i s  
x p l a n a
t i o n  
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not the entire answer. On  the margins, the law does not add much clarity
to bou daries by making harmless trespasses actionable, and harmless
trespasses are by definition inefficient to litigate. Ye t ,  the Jacque court
insisted that a harmless trespass was still a trespass, quoting the English
case Merest v. Harvey:
Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his
window, and that a man intrudes and walks up and down before the
window of his house, and looks in while the owner is at dinner, is
the trespasser permitted to say "here is a halfpenny for you which is
the full extent of the mischief I have done." Would that be a com-
pensation? 1 cannot say that it would b e .
1 1 6As this passage suggests, the Jacques' in  rem right to exclude
endows them with property, not only in their boundaries, but also in
autonomy, to determine how they wil l  enjoy their land. Conceptually,
the Jacque court assumes that the paddock owner and the Jacques' prop-
erty interests cover not only a right to secure borders, but also "the
privacy-driven agenda that the law imputes to ordinary homeowners."
7The precise scope of that zone of privacy is not, to be sure, purely con-
Conceptions of  Property An Essay in Memory of Jim Harris, in PROPERTIES OF LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JIM HARRIS 97 (T. Endicott et al. eds., 2006).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965), quoted p. 7 (emphasis added by Merrill
& Smith).
115. See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 44; Merrill &  Smith, supra note 7, at 1849,1852-54; Carol
M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73,81-82 (1985).
116. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154,159 (Wis. 1997) (quoting McWilliams
v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424,428 (1854) (quoting Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761,761 (1814) (opin-
ion of Gibbs, C.J.))), excerpted pp. 4-5.
117. Katz, supra note 71, at 303.
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ceptual; it is and must be informed by the substantive political morality
informing local opinions about property. Yet , it is still significant that
the Jacque court assumed that what it called a "right to exclude others"
118included what an earlier precedent called owners' "right to the exclusive
enjoyment of' their land.
119 
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property's commercialization function, but also its role as a hedge
prote ting the owner's power to price the land and its use at her own
subjective value. Jacque's principle doubts strongly that judges, juries,
or non-owners can judge relative value more fairly than an owner.
Jacque's holding on punitive damages follows. Steenberg Homes
had strong economic motives to disregard the Jacques' subjective values
in the use or non-use of their field. Without a deterrent, Steenberg
Homes (and parties like it) would be encouraged to expropriate an
owner's subjective value ( if their trespasses caused no damage) or the
difference between owner subjective value and actual damages (if their
trespasses did cause harm). The good faith requirement deters such par-
ties from trying. We take for granted that most individuals are socialized
not to steal property and instead to buy it from the owner. But many are
so socialized because the law punishes strangers who interfere intention-
ally with an owner's autonomy over her property.120
On the other hand, under principles like these, Hinman does not
seem as strong an example o f  governance or welfare-maximizing as
Merrill and Smith suggest. Conceptually, it is unlikely that the owner
will ever be able to make meaningful use of the air column higher than
500 feet. That air column is, therefore, a far weaker candidate to count
as part o f  the owner's property than the Jacques' fallow field.
Economically, then, the overflight exception makes sense as an excep-
tion from the boundary rules confirmed in Jacque. O n  a completely
blank slate, it is reasonable to presume that assets will be used more
productively in private hands than under public management and that
boundary rules take an effective first cut at assigning use rights across
adjoining assets.
I21 F o r  
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t
is rare if not impossible for owners to use those columns productively.
When owners make claims about losing subjective value over that land,
118. Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 159, excerpted p. 5.
119. Id. at 160 (quoting Diana Shooting Club v. Lamoreaux, 89 N.W. 880,886 (Wis. 1902)),
excerpted p. 5. The emphasis is mine.
120. See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of  the Cathedral: The Dominance of  Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091,2096-2101 (1997).
121. See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO—OPERATION AND WELFARE 9 1
-92,101-03 (2d ed., Palgrave Macmillan 2004) (efficiency of boundary rules), excerpted pp. 172-74;
Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979) (advantages of
private ownership); Rose, supra note 115, at 81-82 (efficiency of boundary rules).
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those claims begin to resemble the claims of  the agencies regulating
Moscow department stores. A l l  owners, therefore, benefit from a forced
exchange in which they cede a crossing easement and get air travel, and
the goods and services encouraged by it, in exchange.
I22 T h i s  e x c h a n g esets a precedent for a narrow class of forced exchanges, but not broad
welfare-maximization.
Property Principles and Policies treats nuisance as inconsistently
as it treats Jacque and Hinman. As  Part III explained, the book's intro-
ductory cases suggest that nuisance is a core exclusion doctrine. The
notes after those cases, however, describe nuisance as another example
of governance, in which "courts or other officials determine directly how
the property will be used along one or more dimensions." (Pp. 29-30.)
Chapter 9, the nuisance chapter, repeats the same discrepancy. Adams v.
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co. ,
I23 w h i c h  
r e j e c t s  
a n  
a p p e a
l  
t o  
t r e
a t  
m i n
i n g
pollution as a  trespass, describes trespass as a rights-based tort and
nuisance as an area for interest balancing.124 Yet Adams focuses primar-
ily not on the inner workings o f  nuisance, but on the distinction
between trespass and nuisance. The first case on nuisance, St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. T ipping,
I25 r e j e c t s  
g o v e r n a n
c e .  




d s  
t h
a t  
t h
e
"unreasonability" element of nuisance asks not whether the defendant's
land use is reasonable, but primarily whether the pollution emitted by
that use is appropriate in its neighborhood.
126 T h e  c a s e n o t e s  
a f t e r  
S t .
Helen's then raise the question whether nuisance should follow "more
formalistic" traditional principles, as in St. Helen's, or more instrumen-
talist principles, like the "standard of reasonableness" in tort. (P. 952.)
I f  nuisance partakes of both exclusion and governance, it is not clear how
helpful the exclusion–governance continuum really iS•
127 The cases excerpted in Property: Principles and Policies confirm a
different story: not pure exclusion, not pure governance, but exclusivity
qualified to encourage use. Again, as Hendricks teaches, courts start by
presuming to follow boundary rules—to parcel out productive use poten-
122. See Richard A. Epstein, Intel v. Hamidi: The Role of  Self-help in Cyberspace?, I  J.L.
ECON.& POL'Y 147,154-55 (2005); contra p. 14.
123.602 bl.W.2d 215 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999), excerpted pp. 938-46.
124. See id. at 218-19, excerpted pp. 941-42.
125.11 Eng. Rep. 1483 (1865), excerpted pp. 948-51.
126. See id at 1486-88, excerpted pp. 950-51.
127. In their individual scholarship, Merrill and Smith disagree about whether nuisance relies
on exclusion or governance. Merril l reads nuisance to track interest-balancing as prescribed in the
Restatement (Second) of  Torts, see Merrill, supra note 44, at 26, while Smith reads nuisance to
partake more of boundary rules and other exclusionary principles, see Smith, supra note 20, at 996—
1000. So the above text is more sympathetic to Smith's individual interpretation of nuisance than to
that of the casebook or Merrill's solo scholarship.
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fiat in a fairly simple and apolitical wa y .
1 2 8  A t  t h e  
r e m e d y  
s t a g e ,  
c o u r t s
continue to  enforce exclusion by presuming that substantial pollution
deserves an injunction if  it is ongoing.
I29 Nuisance ov rcomes this presumption more often than trespass
does for reasons similar to those at work in Hinman. Mo s t  productive
uses o f  land emit  low-level boundary invasions like  smoke, noise,
seepage, and so forth. I t  is to the reciprocal advantage of all land owners
that each sacrifice the right to exclude minor disturbances in return for
security to engage in productive uses. Many different aspects of nui-
sance fo llow this logic, most o f  all the unreasonability element fo r
liability. Even though the Restatement (Second) o f  Torts makes "unrea-
sonability" turn on interest balancing, courts normally rig  the balance
to t i l t  depending on whether the defendant is emitting a  boundary
invasion higher than the level ordinarily tolerated in the neighborhood.
13°St. Helen's locality rule confirms the point, and so does the doctrine
relating to hyper-sensitive plaintiffs, who are denied "recovery f o r
irritations that would not disturb an ordinary landowner." (P .  953.) A t
the remedy stage, courts relax the presumption fo r injunctions more
easily in nuisance than in trespass.
131 All of these adjustments, however, reshape nuisance's exclusivity
to make it  enlarge owners' interests in  use. I n  economics terms, "the
mutual toleration o f  low-level interferences" generates "Pareto im-
provements."
132 A s  
l o n g  
a s  
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presumes that these various qualifications stop owners from blockading
productive uses to protect their own subjective valuations. Obviously,
this logic gets strained more often in nuisance than in overflight cases
because pollution threatens owners' possible effective possession and use
of their land more often than does a high-altitude overflight. Even  so,
hard cases do not undermine the principles that order easy cases. T o
determine when an owner's claimed subjective value is  genuine o r
spurious, it helps judges and lawyers to ask whether the rights to exclude
128. See supra notes 38 & 40 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Scott v. Jordan, 661 1
3
. 2d  5 9  ( N . M .  
C t .  
A p p .  
1 9 8 3 ) .  
E s t a n c i
a s  
D a l l
a s  
C o r
p .  
v
.
Schultz, 500 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), excerpted in DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at
646-48, illustrates better than any lead case in Properly: Principles and Policies.
130. See Pestey v. Cushman, 788 A.2d 496,508 (Conn. 2002) ("the focus in [a nuisance] cause
of action is on the reasonableness of the interference and not on the use that is causing the interfer-
ence"); Rose v. Chaikin, 453 A.2d 1378,1382 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (conducting interest
balancing but then relying primarily on the fact that the noise pollution at issue was "louder than
others" in the neighborhood).
131. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), excerpted pp. 956-62.
132. Epstein, supra note 122, at 156.
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On the other hand, nuisance also deviates from the exclusion
paradigm—again, when doing so enlarges owners' free and likely use of
their land. For example, lateral support makes a defendant liable for sub-
sidence on a plaintiff's lot i f  the plaintiff can show that the digging
would have caused the land to collapse in its natural state, or that the
defendant's excavation was careless.
134 O t h e r  
c a s e b o o k s  
c o v e r  
l a t e r a l
support as part of private nuisance.
135 S i n c e  
P r o p e r t y :  
P r i n c i p l e s  
a n d
Policie  focuses on boundary exclusion, however, lateral support falls
onceptually outside of nuisance and property law generally. Neverthe-
ess, in case law, the right to lateral support for land in its natural state is
deemed a "property right,' w h i c h  accompanies the ownership and
enjoyment of the land itself."
136 O n g o i n g  
l a t e r a l -
s u p p o r t  
v i o l a t i
o n s  
a r
e
presumptively remedied by property rules.'
37 Economically, lateral-support doctrine defies the  exclusion–
governance distinction. Lateral-support law does not clearly operate
through exclusion or through governance. On the one hand, owners have
security that their land will not collapse by virtue of their neighbor's dig-
ging; on the other, they have a fair opportunity to use their land without
needing to support structures already built by neighbors. Lateral-support
rules protect a policy interest shared by all owners without comparing the
relative merits of intended land uses except in more extreme cases.
As the lateral-support cases suggest an exclusion-centered frame-
work has a hard time explaining why owners can claim a property right
against non-invasive interferences with use. T hat  discrepancy raises
important questions about how Property: Principles and Policies treats
property doctrines with a heavy focus on use: water rights (pp. 349-72),
spectrum (pp. 372-82), usufructuary interests in commercial information
(see pp. 135-47), and many servitudes (pp. 971-1049).
133. Bamford v. Tumley, 122 Eng. Rep. 27,33 (Exch. 1862) (opinion of Bramwell, B.) (em-
phasis added).
134. See, e.g., Noone v. Price, 298 S.E.2d 218, 221-22 (W. Va. 1982); C.J.S.2D ADJOINING
LANDOWNERS * 9 (West 2008).
135. See, e.g., CRIBBET ET AL., supra note 8, at 691-98; DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 3, at
645-46; SINGER, supra note 9, at 243-61.
136. Sanders v. St. Hwy . Comm'n, 508 1
3
. 2 d  9 8 1 ,  9 8 7  
( K a n .  
1 9 7 3 )  
( q u o t i n g  
2  
T H O M P S
O N  
O N
REAL PROPERTY § 415, at 640 (1961)); Sanders, 508 1
3
. 2d a t  9 9 0  
( e m p h a s e s  
a d d e d ) .  
A c c o r d  
G o r t o n
v. Schofield, 41 N .Eld 12, 15 (Mass. 1942).
137. See, e.g., Gorgon, 41 INI.E.2d at 15.
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D. Enjoyment, and Subjective Valuation
The tensions sketched in Part VLB involve subtle practical differ-
ences, but they matter significantly elsewhere. Boundary exclusion
makes property a clear and stable platform for commercialization, but it
says little or nothing about the rights owners need to optimize the value
of their assets. I n  fairness, one could use a formal right to exclude
conception to analyze whether different legal regimes fully compensate
an owner's subjective value, and Property: Principles and Policies does
voice this concern. (See p• 49- 50)
138 E v e n  s o ,  
t h e  
f o r m a l  
c o n c e p t i
o n
deflects the analysis to a noticeable extent.
Consider private-law property-rule/liability-rule disputes in which
the parties are not strangers and both have some interest in the asset in
dispute. I n  a stranger trespass case, there is a strong presumption for an
injunction (a property rule). I n  most cases, the stranger is trespassing
with a less than innocent state of mind. His  scienter threatens the prop-
erty-respecting social norms discussed in Jacque, and equity reinforces
those norms just as Jacque does through its punitive-damages holding.
139These law and order concerns are not present, however, in a dispute over
an easement when the dominant estate owner wants to increase use over
the amount allowed by the deed conveying the easement. In these cases,
should property law still favor an injunction? Merrill and Smith suggest
not: these disputes are "ripe territory for shifting to some kind of govern-
ance regime." (Teacher's Manual p. 31)  Because both parties have
"sunk investments" and "subjective attachments" i n  their portrait,
"neighbors will be locked into bilateral monopoly situations with each
other" unless courts are willing to balance equities. (Id.)
Yet, the cases excerpted in Property: Principles and Policies still
presume in favor of the injunction. For example, in Delfino v. Vealencis,
the Delfino brothers (two developers) moved to partition a twenty-acre
lot of land they co-owned as tenants in common with Helen Vealencis
(a garbage hauler who lived on the lot under litigation).140 During the
partition, Vealencis wanted a partition in kind (a property rule) so she
could keep her house, business, and the subjective value inherent in both.
The Delfinos preferred partition by sale (a liability rule) because they did
not value Vealencis' attachments to the land, and because they wanted to
outbid her for the lot.
The Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a judgment ordering a
partition by sale. Following nineteenth-century precedent, the court
138. See also Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719,1754-68
(2004) (defending a strong concept of boundary exclusion).
139. See pp. 50-56; Teacher's Manual p. 31.
140.436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980), excerpted pp. 637-42.
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warned: " A  sale of one's property without his consent is an extreme
exercise of power warranted only in clear cases."
14
' " A  p a r t i t i o n  
b y  s a l e
would force the defendant to surrender her home," the court insisted, and
"would jeo ardize her livelihood. I t  is under just such circumstances
that the wisdom o f  the law's  preference for  partition in  k ind is
evident."
142 
I n  
e c o
n o m
i c  
t e
r m

































on the side of protecting subjective value. This  preference matters not
only in co-tenancies but also in easements
143 a n d  c o v e n a n t s  
r u n n i n g  
w i t h
the 1and.
144 As the rent-co trol example in Part V.B suggested, however, this
preference matters most in eminent domain. Consider the public-use
doctrine, which limits governments to exercising eminent domain only
when the taking is for a public use.
145 E c o n o m i c a l l y ,  
c o n d e m n a t i
o n s  
c a n
efficiently break up hold-out power, but they can also inefficiently short-
hange owners' subjective value.
146 I n  K e l o  
v .  C i t y  
o f  
N e w  
L o n d o n
,  
t h e
U.S. Supreme Court held that local urban-renewal plans may transfer
private land to private developers i f  they have a rational and non-
pretextual basis for claiming that the redistribution promotes general
local economic development.' 47
Property: Principles and Policies is generally sympathetic to this
result. The book refrains from editorializing about Kelo; but, the book's
organization s till suggests that local governments can get the hold-
out/subjective-value balance more or less right. The book complains that
141. Id. at 30 (quoting Ford v. Kirk, 41 Conn. 9, 12 (1874)), excerpted p. 639.
142. Id. at 33, excerpted p. 641. I n  fairness, the trial court gave Vealencis a worse deal with
the partition in kind than she would have received in a sale. (See pp. 642-43.) The point important
here, however, is not how the trial court found the facts. T he appellate court declared a general
partition standard that was pro-property rule, to protect subjective value.
143. See, e.g., Penn Bowling Recreation Ctr., Inc. v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66 (D.C.
Cir. 1949), excerpted p. 1010 (presuming that a servient tenement owner may enjoin a dominant
tenement owner from using an easement to service a non-dominant parcel of land).
144. See, e.g., Bolotin v. Rindge, 41 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (Ct. App. 1964) (quoting Miles v.
Clark, 187 P. 167, 172 (Cal. App. 1919)), excerpted p. 1045 (holding, in litigation over a changed-
circumstances defense to enforcing covenants running with the land, that "'[c]ourts in such cases are
not controlled exclusively by money value, but may protect a home").
145. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
146. Merrill provided the model analysis o f  the relevant economic issues in Thomas W.
Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 82-89 (1986).
147. 545 U.S. 469 (2005), excerpted pp. 1224-42. Merrill co-authored an amicus curiae brief
in favor of the Court's eventual decision (and with a significant difference in outlook from his posi-
tion in Merrill, supra note 146) in Kelo in Br ief of the American Planning Association et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Kelt) v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-
108). I n  full disclosure, I co-authored an amicus curiae br ief asking the Court to limit eminent
domain to condemnations actually used by the public. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 2679 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Brief of Amicus Curiae The Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence
In Support of Petitioners, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2004) (No. 04-108).
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"[n]one of the opinions in Kelo discusses the holdout problem" (p. 1244),
without considering seriously the possibility that governments will over-
estimate the risk o f  hold-out. Mo re  tellingly, the section on Kelo and
public use does not consider the subjective-value problem. That problem
is relegated to  the section on just compensation. ( P .  1252.) L o ca l
governments and courts can get just compensation right, the reader rea-
sonably infers often enough to make i t  worthwhile for governments to
routinely redistribute private land.'"
Since Ke lo  has been discussed extensively elsewhere, le t  me
focus on two basic po in ts.
I49  F i r s t ,  
c o n c e p t u a l
l y ,  
i f  
p r o p e
r t y  




right to exclude, Kelo and the other homeowners have a long row to hoe
to prove that their desires not to sell are interests covered by property
rights and property rules. The conceptual framing makes more plausible
New London's pretensions to economic expertise and regulatory govern-
ance. B y  contrast, i f  property consists of the exclusive determination of
use, New London and a commercial developer seem more like ly to be
expropriating property. K e lo  and the others want to determine whether
or not the ir homes w i l l  be sold, and Ne w London authorities are
diminishing their discretion to decide.
Second, Property: Principles and Policies portrays the economics
behind Kelo in a manner that accentuates the positives and eliminates the
negatives in  governance by local redevelopment. I f  the private law's
instincts toward the economics are rig h t ,
1 5 °  K e l o  
e n c o u r a g e s  
l o c a l  
g o v -
ernments to expropriate too much subjective value to break up too little
hold-out power.
151 To begin with, Kelo's rational-basis standard wrongly assumes that
subjective valuation is a minor problem. I n  Kelo, one of the home own-
ers, Withelmina Dery, had been born in the house being condemned, she
had lived there more than 80 years, and she had lived there with her hus-
148. Here, Property: Principles and Policies has more or less the same editorial reactions
toward Kelo as most other property casebooks. For one of the few more skeptical treatments, see JON
W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 680
-
89 ( 6 t h
ed. 2007).
149. See, e.g., Gary Chartier, Urban Redevelopment and Land Reform: Theorizing Eminent
Domain After Kelo, 11 LEGAL THEORY 363 (2005); Daniel B. Kelly, The "Public Use" Requirement
in
Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL
L. REV. I (2006); Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court,
119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 92-99 (2005); Ilya Somin, Controlling the Grasping Hand: Economic
Development Takings After Kelo, 15 S. CT. ECON. REV. 183 (2007). Because this Essay focuses on
conceptual and economic issues, the discussion here abstracts from other relevant issues, including
federalism values and the original meanings of public-use clauses.
150. See supra sections VI.B, VI.C, and notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
151. See Epstein, supra note 120, at 2111-14.
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band more than 60 years.
152 D e r y  
c o u l d  
q u i t e  
r e a s o n
a b l y  
h a v
e  
b e l i
e v e d
that she was likely to die soon if  she did not sell but immediately if  she
did. This is not a situation like a high air column or the low-level pollu-
tion at issue in many non-actionable nuisances. Fair market value, even
together with a generous relocation package,
I53 c o u l d  s t i l l  
s h o r t - c h a n g e
Dery's subjective value.
Next, in contrast with the parallel private law, Kelo's rule does not
consider seriously enough how information disparities limit the success
of redevelopment programs. I n  the private law, as Jacque and De?fin°
suggest, liability and remedial rules presume that markets will predict
better than courts which party will put land to its highest-value use. The
public law may differ in that redevelopment planners may have more
technical expertise than courts. Yet maybe these differences pale in con-
trast with differences between the two from markets.
154 I n  K e l o ,  l o c a lauthorities approved the redevelopment pl n without any signed devel-
opment agreement. The plan committed that the developer could lease
assigned property for $1 per year for 99 years, but it  had no fall-back
provisions in case the project did not meet expectations.
155 ( A c c o r d i n g  t ocontemporary news accounts, the project did not meet expectations.)
156A footnote in Kelo notes the sweetheart lease,
157 b u t  s u c h  
p r o b l e m s  
a r e
not otherwise considered in Property: Principles and Policies.
158 Finally, Kelo's rule seems static; it  underestimates the possibility
that actors may respond dynamically over time to the incentives that re-
development statutes create. This possibility is especially strong because
local governments are more political than courts. Because eminent
152. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475, excerpted p. 1225.
153. Nicole SteIle Garnett has shown that relocation laws often force condemning authorities
to compensate ousted owners substantially more than fair market value. See Nicole SteIle Garnett,
The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REV. 101 (2006). As  Garnett
points out, however, when relocation assistance is provided from a different revenue source than the
source that funds eminent domain, it can increase the demand for inefficient use of eminent domain.
See id. at 140-43.
154. See James M. Buchanan, Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets, 62 J. POL. ECON.
114,122 (1954) (praising the free market "as a means by which the social group is able to move
from one social state to another as a result of  a change in environment without the necessity of
making a collective choice").
155. See Kelo, 843 A i d at 596-99 (Zarella, J., dissenting).
156. See William Yardley, Eminent Domain Project at Standstill Despite Ruling, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21,2005, at Al .
157. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 n.4, excerpted p. 1227.
158. It could be that New London's practice was not representative of  local government's
competence generally. But  New London encountered problems similar to those of the next most
recent major redevelopment case, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d
455,464 (Mich. 1981), overruled by County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004).
See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of  Wayne v. Hathcocic, Economic Development
Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005.
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domain condemns land at market value and not owner value, it  gives
developers and retailers an opportunity to seek rent. Properly: Princi-
ples and Policies is sensitive to public-choice arguments elsewhere, but
not in the constitutional context of Kelo • (See pp. 1244-45.) The book
notes dutifully, but skeptically, that Pfizer had been lobbying New Lon-
don authorities to redevelop the neighborhood adjacent to its site for a
new plant:
59 
( S e e  
p .  
1 2 4
3 . )
I f  these public- and institutional-choice concerns count, eminent
domain should be restricted to allow only takings used by the public or
by common carriers. Oversimplified somewhat, local governments need
to provide rigorous proof that land owners are holding out despite the
absence of legitimate subjective value:
60 I n  K e l o ,  i t  
w a s  
n o t  
c r e d i b l e  
t o
say the petition rs were hold-outs who could exercise real monopoly
power. The petitioners' homes were small pieces of a 90-acre project:
61The condemning authorities never committed how specifically the
petitioners' lots would be used. Since the authorities had also spared an
Italian Dramatic Club due to entreaties by leading New London figures
(p. 1245), the authorities could have spared Kelo's and the other
petitioners' properties.
VII. CONCLUSION
Property: Principles and Policies is the most important contribu-
tion to the market for  first-year Property casebooks in  at least a
generation or more. A t  least since the Legal Realist era, judges and
instrumentalist academics have used conceptual accounts o f  property
apologetically to portray instrumentalist theories of property regulation
in a justifying conceptual context. Many  contemporary property case-
books reflect this trend by portraying legal property as an ad hoc bundle
of rights. Merr ill and Smith have pushed back by portraying property as
an owner's right to exclude non-owners from an asset and (by extension)
a wide range of undelineated use choices.
Yet Properly: Principles and Policies also raises important follow-
up questions about what it means to say that property consists of a right
to exclude. The right to exclude conception of property is similar to the
ad hoc bundle conception; both were propounded by Legal Realists to do
covert normative work in conceptual clothing. Conceptually, it is more
159. See Ted Mann, Pfizer's Fingerprints on Fort Trumbull Plan—Wired in at Birth, NEW
LONDON DAY, Oct. 1
6,  2 0 0 5 .160. See, e.g., Head v. Arnoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 365
(1869); Eric R. Claeys, Public-Use Limitations and Natural Property Rights, 2004 MICH. Sr. L.
REV. 877, 901-05, 919-28; Epstein, supra note 120, at 2111-14.
161. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474, excerpted p. 1225.
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precise to say that property refers to an owner's interest in exclusively
determining the use of the thing he owns. Economically, both concep-
tions justify  property as  a  stable platform for  coordination and
commerce. Bu t  an exclusive right of use determination better justifies
the rights owners have to  use productively the things they own
exclusively.
